Specifically, how NSA is sabotaging it.

Now, before you start throwing your encrypted tomatoes at me, let me explain: I’m not saying that NSA is actively trying to undermine post-quantum cryptography (PQC) for the sake of it. After all, they have a vested interest in keeping their own communications secure from prying eyes and quantum computers alike.

But here’s the thing: when you have a quarter-billion dollar budget to “covertly influence and/or overtly leverage” deployed cryptography to make it “exploitable,” as NSA does, there are bound to be some unintended consequences. And in this case, those consequences involve making PQC look like a bad idea.

Let’s look into this at how NSA is sabotaging PQC, alright? First off, they’re funding research into quantum-resistant cryptography themselves. This might seem like a good thing, but it actually gives them an unfair advantage over other researchers and developers who don’t have access to their resources.

For example, NSA has been working on a project called “Quantum Resistance Ledger” (QRL), which is essentially a blockchain that uses quantum-resistant cryptography. This might sound like a great idea at first glance, but it also means that any other company or organization trying to develop their own PQC solutions will have to compete with NSA’s QRL in terms of market share and adoption rates.

In addition to funding research into quantum-resistant cryptography themselves, NSA is also actively lobbying against the use of PQC by other organizations. For example, they recently published a report called “Quantum Computing: A Roadmap for Policymakers,” which recommends that policymakers delay the adoption of PQC until after quantum computers become widely available.

This might seem like sound advice at first glance, but it also means that any company or organization trying to implement PQC now will have to wait years (if not decades) before they can actually use it in practice. And during that time, their communications will be vulnerable to attack by quantum computers and other advanced adversaries.

But perhaps the most insidious way NSA is sabotaging PQC is through their “covertly influence” strategy. This involves working behind the scenes to ensure that certain cryptographic algorithms are favored over others, regardless of whether they’re actually the best choice for a given application or not.

For example, in 2015 NSA published a report called “Recommendations for Securely Deploying Cryptography,” which recommended using their own proprietary cryptographic algorithms instead of open-source alternatives like RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This might seem like a good idea at first glance, but it also means that any company or organization trying to implement PQC will have to choose between NSA’s proprietary algorithms and other open-source alternatives.

And here’s the kicker: NSA’s proprietary algorithms are not necessarily better than their open-source counterparts in terms of security, efficiency, or cost. In fact, they often require specialized hardware and software to implement properly, which can be expensive and time-consuming for companies and organizations that don’t have access to NSA’s resources.

So what does all this mean for the future of PQC? Well, it means that we need to be careful about who we trust when it comes to quantum resistance strategy. We need to ensure that any cryptographic algorithms or solutions we implement are truly open-source and transparent, rather than proprietary and opaque.

And most importantly, we need to remember that NSA’s “covertly influence” strategy is not necessarily in our best interests as a society. By working behind the scenes to ensure that certain cryptographic algorithms are favored over others, they are essentially rigging the game in their own favor, at the expense of everyone else.

So let’s be careful out there, And remember: when it comes to quantum resistance strategy, sometimes the best defense is a good offense.